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Editing out the embryo: the debate over “human genome editing” in the United Kingdom  
Abstract 
Two conferences on “genome editing” held in December 2015 offer a lens through which to analyse 
bioethics policies in the United Kingdom, in contrast with those in the United States.  The “Progress 
Educational Trust”, which hosted the London conference, has no parallel in the USA.  It illustrates the 
close collaboration between UK government departments, scientific bodies, funding organisations, 
and lobby groups.  The rhetoric of responsible regulation used in the UK serves to protect, not the 
embryo, but the practice of embryo destruction.  Advocates of embryo experimentation in the UK are 
eager to “lead the way in the debate about genome editing”.  It would be perilous for the 
international community to allow the UK to frame the debate in this way.  
A tale of two cities 
In December 2015 two conferences were held on the topic of human genome editing,1 one in 
Washington DC, the other in London.  In Washington, the US National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering and Medicine, in collaboration with the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the UK’s Royal 
Society, hosted a three-day International Summit on Human Gene Editing.2  In London, less than a 
week later, a one-day conference was held on the same theme under the title From Three-Person 
IVF to Genome Editing: The science and ethics of engineering the embryo.3  
Following the Washington summit, the US National Academies convened a multidisciplinary 
committee of experts to produce a consensus study on Human Gene Editing: Scientific, Medical, and 
Ethical Considerations.  This was published on 14 February 2017.4  
The London conference did not lead to a report, but at the same time as that conference was being 
held, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, also based in London, was itself considering the same topic.  
In July 2015 the Nuffield Council had announced the formation of a working group to explore the 
ethical issues raised by novel techniques for genome editing.  They invited contributions from 
experts and held an open call for evidence that ran from November 2015 until February 2016.5  The 
initial report, Genome editing: an ethical review,6 published in September 2016, covered human 
health (understanding disease, treating disease, avoiding genetic disease, and human enhancement) 
as well as food, the impact on the natural environment, and other applications.  Following this 
                                                          
1 There are differences in connotation between “gene editing” and “genome editing”, as the latter places the 
genetic intervention in the context of the genome as a whole.  Nevertheless these differences do not amount 
to differences in what is proposed and hence the two terms will be used interchangeably in this paper. 
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6 Nuffield Council on Bioethics Genome editing: an ethical review (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2016).  
general overview a second working group was established specifically to consider Genome Editing 
and Human Reproduction. 7 At the time of writing this second working group has yet to report. 
The parallel initiatives in London and in Washington, both in relation to the hosting of conferences 
and in relation to the commissioning of reports, offer a lens through which to compare discussion of 
bioethics and public policy in the United Kingdom and that in the United States.  The focus of the 
present paper is the approach taken in the UK with the US approach presented primarily as a foil for 
that discussion.  This method will highlight some of the shortcomings of the UK approach to 
bioethical discussion of the human embryo.  It will also help explain why the UK remains such a 
persistent promotor, within the international arena, of lethal experimentation on embryonic human 
beings. 
Bioethicists or scientists?  
The UK equivalent of the US National Academy of Sciences is the Royal Society, and this was a co-
sponsor of the international summit in Washington from which emerged the expert working group.  
However, within the UK, the national discussion of human genome editing has not been led by the 
Royal Society.  Rather, a prominent role in the UK debate has been played by the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics.  The UK has no national bioethics committee but the Nuffield Council fulfils this role for 
some purposes.   
It is entirely appropriate that a national bioethics committee should discuss an issue so manifold in 
its bioethical and public policy implications as human genome editing.  This raises the question of 
why the US discussion has not also been led by the equivalent national committee, that is, by the 
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues.  The fact this has not happened is 
particularly striking given the prominent cultural position of bioethics within the USA.  Bioethics as a 
discipline emerged in the USA in the 1970s,8 and it remains, to a very large extent, a discourse 
framed by American concepts and concerns.9  
The lack of engagement of the Presidential Commission on the issue of gene editing is perhaps best 
understood as a transient effect and one that may represent a reaction to the prominence of the 
President’s Council on Bioethics at the time of President George W Bush.  Members of the Obama 
administration were unhappy with some of arguments presented by the previous President’s 
Council, especially in relation to human cloning,10 human embryonic stem cell research,11 and 
concept of human dignity.12  To prevent conservative voices in bioethics from influencing policy 
during the tenure of this administration, the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical 
Issues was not only reconstituted in membership but was also directed to less politically 
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controversial areas.  The issue of gene editing was therefore considered not by the national 
bioethics body but by a body representing scientists: the National Academy of Sciences.    
It may seem that, in relation to the current gene-editing debate, the approach of United Kingdom is 
preferable, for in the UK it is a national bioethics body that is helping to lead the discussion.  
Nevertheless, this apparent contrast underestimates the influence of scientists, science funding 
bodies, and government in framing the bio-policy debate in the United Kingdom.  This is even more 
evident when one considers the organisation that hosted the London conference on genome editing 
in December 2015: the Progress Educational Trust.   
What is “progress”? 
The Progress Educational Trust has no parallel in the USA and helpfully illustrates the links between 
government, the scientific establishment and non-governmental actors in shaping policy on embryo 
research in the United Kingdom.  To understand the character and role of this organisation it is 
necessary to revisit, at least briefly, the formative period of UK policy on embryo experimentation.     
The context for this debate was the birth in 1978 in the North of England of Louise Brown the first 
child born as a result of in vitro fertilisation.  Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979 and 
her Conservative government was strongly supportive of this technology.  Thatcher was herself the 
first, and to date the only, British Prime Minister to hold a degree in a scientific discipline.  From 
1943 to 1947 she read chemistry at Oxford and in her final year applied X-ray crystallography to 
determine the structure of the antibiotic gramicidin.13  This was just six years before similar 
techniques led scientists in London and Cambridge to discover the double helix structure of DNA.  
However, while Thatcher and her government wished to protect the practice of In Vitro Fertilisation 
and thus of embryo experimentation, they were aware of concerns expressed by members of the 
public, elements of the media, and members of parliament including many MPs within the 
Conservative Party itself.  
The Conservative government addressed these concerns in 1982 by establishing a Committee of 
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology chaired by the philosopher Mary Warnock.  The 
Committee reported14 in 1984 and its recommendations led to the establishing in 1985 of an interim 
voluntary licensing authority.  However, also in 1985, the former Conservative MP Enoch Powell 
introduced the Unborn Children (Protection) Bill which would have prohibited destructive 
experimentation on human embryos.  The Bill passed its first reading with a large majority (238 to 
66).15  This vote caused alarm among supporters of IVF and led directly to the establishment of the 
“Progress Campaign for Research into Human Reproduction.”  The Campaign had but one aim: “to 
make sure that human embryo research was protected by law so that IVF treatment could 
continue.”16   
According to Fritz Schumacher, “progress . . . can be said to be an essential feature of all life.  The 
whole point is to determine what constitutes progress.”17  Nevertheless, the rhetorical force of the 
term “progress” in political discourse typically functions to beg this question.  The word implies, 
                                                          
13 Jon Agar, “Thatcher, scientist,” Notes and Records of the Royal Society 65.3 (2011): 215-232. 
14 Mary Warnock (chair) Report of the committee of inquiry into human fertilization and embryology, London: 
HM Stationery Office, 1984. 
15 Hansard HC Deb 15 February 1985 vol 73 cc637-702, see also Michael Mulkay, “Political parties, 
parliamentary lobbies and embryo research,” Public Understanding of Science 4.1 (1995): 31-55. 
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insinuates, or at least suggests, that technical innovation leads necessarily to real benefits for 
individuals and for society.  It is precisely for these connotations that the “Progress Campaign for 
Research into Human Reproduction” was so named.  The name implies that to oppose 
experimentation on human embryos is to oppose “progress”.   
It is not true, as some have asserted, that efforts to prohibit embryo experimentation in 1985 were 
“very nearly successful.”18  The size of the majority is in this respect deceptive.  Most MPs had not 
taken part in the vote and Private Member's Bills which are at all contentious “have little chance of 
passage without the aid of Government.”19  It is a simple matter to talk such bills out of time.  The 
problem for the government was that it was not enough to block all such attempts at prohibition.  
To implement the recommendations of the Warnock Committee the government would need to 
bring forward its own bill, and such a bill would be open to amendment by members of parliament.  
The strategy of the government was therefore to delay the introduction of legislation until it was 
confident that it had the backing of sufficient MPs.  To achieve this, the government needed the help 
of scientists and campaigning organisations to shift public opinion, to reframe the dominant 
narrative presented by the media, and to lobby MPs.  The founding of the Progress Campaign was 
the beginning of a long history of co-operation, sometimes overt, sometimes tacit or even covert, 
between government departments, scientific bodies, and lobby groups to secure the practice of 
embryo experimentation in the United Kingdom.   
By 1990 a sustained media campaign, and work both alongside and independent of the government, 
had shifted opinion within Parliament.  A major media boost was the story of the first successful 
pregnancy after sex-selection to prevent the inheritance of a sex-linked genetic disease.20  This 
reinforced the image of the technology as beneficial for parents at the same time as showing the UK 
at the cutting edge of scientific innovation.  In the lead-up to the final vote the Progress Campaign 
arranged for 200 families affected by genetic disease to visit parliament and, as a result of such 
activities, “in the crucial debates in late 1989 and early 1990, 75 per cent of those arguing for 
embryo research made significant reference to its potential contribution to the prevention of 
genetic disorder.”21  
In the final vote in the House of Commons on 21 June 1990, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990 was passed comfortably by 303 to 65.22  The two main political parties allowed their MPs a 
“free vote” but this political luxury was permitted in part because the outcome was not in doubt.  
The bill had cross-party support and a clear steer in favour from the front benches both of the 
government and of the official opposition.  The passing of this Act effectively fixed UK policy on 
human embryo experimentation and related issues for the next quarter of a century.  In 1992, in 
recognition that the single aim of the Progress Campaign had substantially been achieved, but also 
that it had been achieved only through very active media engagement, the Campaign gave way to a 
new organisation: the Progress Educational Trust.  This was the body that hosted the London 
conference in 2015. 
                                                          
18 Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy (Oxford: Hart, 2001), 183. Echoed 
by the Progress Educational Trust, “Background”. 
19 D. Marsh, P. Gowin, and M. Read,. “Private member's bills and moral panic the case of the 
video recordings bill (1984)”. Parliamentary Affairs 39 (1986): 179- 190 cited by Mulkay "Political parties”, 33. 
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21 Michael Mulkay, The Embryo Research Debate: Science and the Politics of Reproduction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 63. 
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Over time the settlement represent by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 has 
become only more deeply entrenched.  Scientific developments and legal challenges have led to the 
passing of further regulations (especially in 2001 and 2015), and to one major revision of the Act (in 
2008), but these have all occurred within the frame established by the 1990 Act.  These 
developments have not represented a change in direction but rather a further extension of the 
approach taken by the Act.   
The approach of UK legislation may be characterised as bureaucratic permissiveness ornamented by 
cosmetic prohibitions.  The law is designed to have an inclusive scope for the activities referred to, 
so that all experimentation on human embryos falls within its remit.  Within this, the law grants 
permission for a very broad range of research and treatments, but only under licence.  On the other 
hand it prohibits absolutely only those activities which have little or no support from scientific 
bodies.  Hence such prohibitions are cosmetic, intended to give public reassurance without 
restricting any action for which there is scientific support. The changes that have occurred since 
1990 have not altered this pattern but have only widened the scope of the Act and increased the 
number and kinds of controversial activities permitted under licence.   
Currently germline gene therapy of human beings by means of gene editing is prohibited by the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended 2008).  This is simply because hitherto 
bodies representing scientists have not expressed interest in pursuing this activity.  Genome editing 
in the context of reproduction would require a further amendment of the 1990 Act.  Nevertheless, 
such an amendment would conform to an established pattern of previous incremental extensions of 
the law.  Debate on this issue is therefore almost certain to follow the same contours as previous 
debates.   
Divergences in development  
It is helpful at this point to compare the development of UK legislation with the formation of policy 
on embryo research in the USA.  Prima facie it might seem that the context for such policy was very 
similar.  Both Great Britain23 and the United States have permissive regimes for abortion which have 
remained unchanged in their fundamentals for over forty years (since 1967 and 1973 respectively). 
Similarly, in both countries in vitro fertilisation is widely available and scientists are permitted not 
only to use but also to create human embryos for research purposes.   In both countries the national 
legal and policy approach for embryo experimentation has been shaped by the previous settlement 
on abortion.  However, it is precisely this similarity that reveals a deeper dissimilarity.   
The fundamental rationale for the liberalisation of abortion law in Britain was utility or harm 
reduction both in relation to the woman and to society.  Hence the law requires that two doctors 
certify a quasi-medical indication for termination of pregnancy.  These indications include not only a 
risk of injury to the physical or mental health of the mother but also a “substantial risk that if the 
child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously 
handicapped.”24 
The explicit inclusion of disability as an indication for abortion reflects a eugenic mentality that runs 
deep in the British psyche (though certainly, it is not always overt).  Indeed, the term “eugenic” was 
                                                          
23 The United Kingdom includes Great Britain and Northern Ireland and but the Abortion Act 1967 does not 
apply in Northern Ireland, hence in relation to abortion policy it is more accurate to refer to Great Britain 
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24 Abortion Act 1967 (as amended 1990) section 1(1)(d) 
coined by an Englishman, Francis Galton, in 1883.25 So too the First International Eugenics Congress 
occurred in London in 1912.26  The eugenics movement in England also attracted support from some 
prominent members of the established Church, perhaps most prominently Rev William Inge, Lady 
Margaret's Professor of Divinity in Cambridge and later Dean of St Paul’s Cathedral.  He was a 
founder member of the Eugenics Education Society in 1907.27  An important element to the 
background of the Abortion Act 1967 was public sympathy for the victims of thalidomide.  The drug, 
prescribed for morning sickness, was introduced in the UK in 1958 and in use until 1961.  It was 
withdrawn following reports that it caused children to be born with limb deficiencies and a variety of 
other disabilities.  According to advocates of abortion “thalidomide was the motor that reinvigorated 
the Abortion law Reform association and which paved the way for reform.”28  Support for eugenic 
abortion thus helped secure support for the bill as a whole.  
The passing of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 followed a similar pattern.  Support 
for this law was also based on the utility of IVF, both as a treatment of infertility and for the control 
of genetically inherited disease.  As with the Abortion Act 1967, the eugenic possibilities of this 
technology increased political support for the law.29  Also, as with the Abortion Act, while 
destruction of unborn life was permitted on the basis of supposed utility, the law also required 
particular authorisation (from two doctors in the case of abortion or from the licensing authority in 
the case of embryo experimentation).  These laws are permissive but within limits: cases that fall 
clearly outside the respective laws are prohibited.30   
Both Britain and the USA both have very permissive regimes on abortion, effectively allowing 
abortion for any reason until 24 week (in Great Britain) or 26 weeks (in the USA) and allowing 
abortion until birth in some circumstances (not limited to cases where the mother’s life is in danger).  
In this respect they have more in common with one another than they do with most European 
jurisdictions, and represent the far extreme from the more restrictive legislative approach that 
predominates in South America or Africa.  However, in relation to the mechanism, rationale, and 
public support of legalisation, Britain and the USA are radically different.   
                                                          
25 Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development (London, England: Macmillan and Co., 
1883) 
26 “First International Eugenics Congress” Br Med J 2 (3 August 1912): 253. 
27 William R. Inge, “Some Moral Aspects of Eugenics,” Eugenics Review 1.1 (April 1909): 26–36. See also 
William R. Inge, “Eugenics and Religion,” Eugenics Review 12.4 (January 1921): 257–65; F. Hale, “Debating the 
New Religion of Eugenics,” Heythrop Journal 52.3 (2011): 445–57; David Albert Jones “Apostles of Suicide: 
Theological Precedent for Christian Support of ‘Assisted Dying’,” Studies in Christian Ethics 29.3 (2016): 331–
338.  Other prominent Christian eugenicists in this period include Ernest Barnes, the Anglican Bishop of 
Birmingham, see T. Merricks, “‘God and the Gene’: E.W. Barnes on Eugenics and Religion,” Politics, Religion & 
Ideology 13.3 (2012): 353–74. 
28 K. Hindell and M. Simms, Abortion Law Reformed (London: Peter Owen, 1971), 108 cited in David Albert 
Jones, The Soul of the Embryo: An Enquiry into the Status of the Human Embryo in the Christian Tradition 
(London: Continuum, 2004), 204. 
29 For example, the most prominent opposed of embryo experimentation, Enoch Powell, was neverthless a 
strong supporter of eugenic screening, see Anastasia A. Theodosiou, and Martin H. Johnson, “The politics of 
human embryo research and the motivation to achieve PGD,” Reproductive biomedicine online 22.5 (2011): 
457-471. 
30 In relation to abortion, however, there is often little interest in enforcing such prohibitions even where they 
exist.  For example, the sex of a child is not a legal basis for abortion in the United Kingdom (except where the 
child carries a sex-linked disease) and yet when abortions have been performed explicitly to avoid giving birth 
to a girl, doctors have not been prosecuted. 
In Britain legalisation of abortion was by Act of Parliament.  The Act had a large degree of 
parliamentary and public support and the rationale was primarily harm reduction.  The rhetoric of 
choice, self-determination and privacy had relatively little influence either in the public debate or in 
the final shape of the law.  In contrast abortion was legalised in the USA not by a positive law 
endorsed by democratic process and supported by the public but by a judgement of the Supreme 
Court which declared existing restrictions on abortion to be unconstitutional.31  The basis of this 
decision was not utility, harm reduction or “reproductive health” but privacy and freedom from 
state coercion.  An important implication of this rationale is that, while States are not permitted to 
outlaw the practice of abortion, they have no constitutional duty to provide abortion, and the Hyde 
Amendment of 1976, which restricted federal funding for abortion, was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in 1980.32 
When, in 1979, the US Ethics Advisory Board (EAB) considered “Research Involving Human In Vitro 
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer”,33 the question was therefore not whether embryo 
experimentation should be permitted but whether embryo experimentation should receive federal 
funding.  In contrast to Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, who came to power in 1981, was 
opposed to destructive experimentation on human embryos and so the recommendations of the 
EAB were side-lined, a policy maintained by President George HW Bush.  President Bill Clinton 
publicly expressed support for funding research on “surplus” embryos but nevertheless signed into 
law the Dickey-Wicker Amendment in 1995 which denied public funds to research in which the 
embryo was destroyed.  The issue of federal funding for embryo experimentation, and for 
experimentation that presupposed embryo destruction, became contested only after stem cells 
were derived from human embryos in 1998.  However, the issue was successfully evaded by Clinton, 
leaving it to his successor, President George W Bush to be the first President to provide federal funds 
for experimentation that presupposed embryo destruction, albeit not to the extent that his critics 
wished.34  
While the theory of eugenics was developed in the United Kingdom, it was not applied in practice in 
Britain in the 1920s and 1930s, in part because of the vocal opposition of G.K. Chesterton35 and 
others, but more importantly (in political terms) because of its associations with Prussian 
Nationalism.36  In contrast, the United States is one of a few countries to develop large scale 
programmes of eugenic sterilisation.37  Perhaps for this reason, eugenic considerations played little 
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Eugenics and other evils, preface. 
37 See, for example: Edwin Black, War against the Weak: Eugenics and America’s Campaign to Create a Master 
Race, (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003); Paul A. Lombardo, ed., A century of eugenics in America: 
from the Indiana experiment to the human genome era (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2011); 
 
or no part in shaping the Supreme Court judgements on abortion or the subsequent debates over 
funding for abortion and for embryo experimentation.  It is notable that while various iterations of 
the Hyde Amendment have permitted federal funding for abortion in exceptional circumstances, 
such as rape, incest and danger to the mother’s life, the disability of the child has never been 
included as a reason for funding abortion. 
It seems that the “shameful era”38 of compulsory eugenic sterilisation in the USA has at least helped 
American commentators to acknowledge the possibility that eugenic ideas can reinforce 
discrimination and lead to new forms of injustice, even in a democracy.  In contrast, there is little 
awareness in a UK context of the role England played in promoting eugenics and its associated 
historical injustices.  Hence, while the international summit in Washington included prominent 
reflection on the history of eugenics,39 the subject was only mentioned in the London conference in 
passing, and then through a question from the floor.40 
From a Catholic perspective there are fundamental problems with the framing of the debate both in 
the United States and in Britain.  The history of debate over abortion and embryo experimentation in 
the United States has led to a focus on the question of federal funding rather than on the possibility 
of legal prohibition.  Such a frame is not conducive to assessing the arguments for the prohibition of, 
or even a moratorium on, certain forms of research even when this would clearly be beneficial.  The 
approach of the United Kingdom appears at least to be concerned with the right question, which is 
whether certain forms of activity should be prohibited or permitted (not merely whether or not they 
should be funded).  On the other hand, the law in Britain is much more overtly favourable to eugenic 
interventions, whether by selective abortion or by screening out of human embryos.  The model 
provided by UK legislation has as its default setting the legal permissibility of controversial research 
and treatment, subject to licence.  Thus, while American and British models of addressing embryo 
experimentation differ, neither is adequate to the issue of justice to the human embryo and neither 
is helpful in a situation where a prohibition seems the most effective measure to secure the 
common good.  In this respect the model provided by German,41 and to a lesser extent the models in 
France 42 and in Italy,43 while each imperfect, are more adequate to principles of justice and the 
dignity of the human embryo.  
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Public engagement as ‘strategic public relations’ 
In relation to human gene editing technology the primary danger in the United States is not 
governmental or professional action but is rather a lack of action.  By default, what is not prohibited 
is permitted, and debates about federal funding will not prevent clinicians offering gene editing 
technology where there is a market for this.  In contrast, in the United Kingdom, germline gene 
editing is currently illegal and will remain so unless the law changes.  However, the pattern of 
government intervention has consistently favoured extension of the law in favour of further genetic 
control over reproduction.   
In this context, it is hard to overemphasise the prestige that biotechnology, and especially embryo 
experimentation and reproductive technologies, has enjoyed in the eyes of successive British 
governments.  While Britain may have lagged behind other countries in space exploration and in 
other scientific projects requiring very high levels of government spending, it can boast not only the 
discovery of the double helix structure of DNA in 1953 but the first child born after IVF in 1978, the 
first children born following pre-implantation genetic diagnosis in 1990 and the first cloned mammal 
in 1997.  In 2007 a British scientist, Martin Evans, shared a Nobel Prize for his work on embryonic 
stem cells.   
Successive governments are also proud of the way government policy overcame public concerns 
about this technology after a long period of engagement including co-ordination with non-
government actors culminating in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.  Unlike the 
situation in USA, the ethical acceptability of abortion and embryo experimentation is not a matter on 
which public opinion is finely divided or a matter on which the two main political parties differ 
substantially.  In the UK, governments of the right and of the left have sought to maintain the status 
quo on abortion and have shown strong support for embryo experimentation.  Those who express 
principled opposition to such practices do so from the political margins.  
The 1990 Act not only established the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) as the 
vehicle for maintaining public trust.  It also established a pattern of public engagement that was pro-
active, strongly directed towards securing a desired policy goal, and more-or-less co-ordinated 
between government and non-governmental bodies.  Having been successful in achieving the legal 
settlement this approach became a model for future public engagement by the government, the 
HFEA, and other actors.  This approach is well analysed by the Canadian bioethicist Francoise Baylis, 
remarking of a particular consultation by the HFEA that it showed “a clear policy preference in 
support of research …[and that], in many respects, the HFEA consultation process can be seen as an 
exercise in strategic public relations”.44 
This model of “strategic public relations” is also evident in the purported rationale of the Act, for it 
achieved its aim under the guise of doing precisely the opposite.  The effective political rationale for 
the Act, well-expressed by the Progress Campaign was “to make sure that human embryo research 
was protected by law”,45 that is, to protect practices that involve destroying human embryos.  
However, the purported rationale of the Act was to uphold the “special status” of the human 
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embryo.  It has become customary to repeat this supposed rationale each time the Act is revisited, 
for example:  
The starting point for consideration of the ethics of research on human embryos is the status 
of the early embryo.46 
We have concluded that the embryo should be accorded special status in common with the 
Warnock Committee.47 
We acknowledge that the special status of the embryo means regulation of both research 
and treatment continues to be appropriate and desirable.48 
I have argued elsewhere that for this reason UK policy on human embryo research is disingenuous at 
a fundamental level.  The claimed “special status” of the human embryo disguises a purely 
instrumentalist view of the embryo and, what is more, a purely instrumentalist view of public 
engagement.  Discussion of the status of the human embryo is, in reality, “a cipher for other 
concerns, principally the maintenance of public confidence.”49    
Sometimes in international discussion the UK presents itself as a moderate middle way between the 
deregulation of countries such as the United States and the restrictive approach of some European 
nations.  The analysis presented here shows that this is misleading.  The UK is not somewhere in the 
middle but rather at the most extreme position both in what is permitted by law and in relation to 
aggressive pursuit of novel forms of embryo experimentation.  In a UK context, regulation is thus 
supported not because it inhibits or restricts experimentation on human embryos but precisely 
because it helps facilitate such experimentation.  It is “deregulation via regulation”.50  This explains 
the pattern of British engagement, both governmental and non-governmental, in international 
discussions of embryo experimentation or genetic engineering.  The attitude of the US government 
in such discussions varies depending on the administration in power whereas the attitude of the UK 
government is consistently the most vocal in opposing international restrictions on embryo 
experimentation or genetic engineering.51   
This approach to public engagement is by no means unique to bioethical issues.  It is an established 
trope in British political life.  So often, neither the final decision nor the overall direction of travel will 
genuinely be open to revision.  The decision will have been made in advance and “consultation” will 
not be directed to criticism or improvement of a proposal but to persuasion of the consultees.  Such 
a pattern of practice exemplifies an elitist and anti-democratic aspect of British political life that 
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remains within its democratic processes.  Were it to be made explicit as a philosophy it would 
perhaps be what Bernard Williams has termed “government house utilitarianism”.52   
Un-Wellcome influence 
Another difference between the UK and the USA is the great influence in the UK context of a few 
nongovernmental funding bodies which have become politicised.  This is true of some medical 
research charities but most especially of the Wellcome Trust, the UK's largest non-governmental 
source of funds for biomedical research, with an endowment currently worth more than £18 
billion.53  
In the proposed revision of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act in 2008, perhaps the most 
controversial proposal was to legalise the creation of admixed (or hybrid) human-nonhuman 
embryos.  The Wellcome Trust was strongly in favour of this change in the law and engaged actively 
with the media and with politicians to promote this aspect of the bill.  According to Dr Mark 
Walport, the Director of the Trust at that time, “We wanted to explain both the need for research, 
and the science underlying the proposals, including the creation of hybrid embryos… work with the 
media on the issue began many months prior to the publication of the actual Bill. This ensured that 
the press was ready to respond when controversy arose.”54 
An important mechanism for this “work with the media” was the Science Media Centre, itself part-
funded by the Wellcome Trust.  The Science Media Centre was founded “to provide accurate, 
independent scientific information for the media” but in practice “its views are largely in line with 
government scientific policy.”55  The Wellcome Trust also worked closely with the Medical Research 
Council, the Association of Medical Research Charities, and the Academy of Medical Sciences, as well 
as with individual scientists and journalists.  In addition, Mark Walport, as Director of the Trust, 
himself frequently spoke to the media and issued press statements.  Characteristically these 
statements appealed to the prestige of embryo experimentation and emphasised the alleged 
consensus of “the scientific community” in favour of this particular avenue of research.  
The award of the 2007 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine to Martin Evans and colleagues 
signals the strength of the UK in embryo and stem cell research.  It is therefore timely that 
Government has now taken on board the concerns of the scientific community in its 
response to the Joint Committee Report.56 
As with previous government sponsored embryo-related legislation, the 2008 revision of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act passed comfortably (by 355 to 129).57  However, it is far from clear 
that the intense campaigning in favour of the 2008 Act succeeded in “achieving an informed public 
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debate”. 58 Analysis of the media reporting59 shows that, of over 100 newspaper reports analysed, 
72% included some exaggerated or misleading scientific claims, for example, that the research aimed 
to “cure” or “provide treatment” for certain named diseases, or that it was to “save lives”.  Indeed, 
22% of these reports made claims that were clearly unfounded, for example, asserting that such 
research “is necessary” to make medical progress or that patients “will benefit” if the research goes 
ahead, for example, “for illnesses like motor neurone disease, hybrid embryos will make a huge 
difference.”60   
Having convinced of the public of the great and urgent scientific “need” for creating hybrid embryos, 
it came as a shock to many when, even before the Act came into force, this avenue of research was 
abandoned by the only teams in the UK working in this area.  The research had failed to secure 
funding through the process of scientific peer review.  The pubic were unprepared for this as only 
18% of news reports about the research acknowledged that there were scientific reservations about 
the techniques and only 8% mentioned that there were alternative avenues of research being 
developed.61  While the expenditure of funds and of time and energy by the Wellcome Trust and 
other funding bodies were successful in winning the media battle and the parliamentary vote to 
allow hybrid embryo experimentation, it would seem that, “this victory was won largely at the 
expense of the public understanding of science.”62 
It is not only critics of embryo experimentation who have expressed misgivings about the influence 
of the Wellcome Trust in shaping policy on biomedical research in the United Kingdom.  Professor 
Marcus Pembrey, a founder of the Progress Educational Trust and at one time a principal 
investigator of the Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium gave the following evidence to the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology: 
Increasingly—by default—the Wellcome Trust is having a disproportionate influence on 
policy and yet is answerable to just a few governors.  With its huge financial resources the 
Wellcome Trust has become the major lead on research in genomic medicine and this has 
led to the WT trying to dictate policy in a number of areas… [sometimes] naively, in my 
opinion…63 
Another instance of the Wellcome Trust appearing to “dictate policy” is in relation to maternal 
spindle transfer (MST) and pro-nuclear transfer (PNT) to prevent transmission of mitochondrial 
disease.  These techniques, together termed “mitochondrial donation” by the government64 but 
popularly described as “three parent IVF”65 had been included in the Human Fertilisation and 
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Embryology Act 2008 as a possible subject for future regulations.66  The process of consultation in 
preparation for such regulations began in 2012.  However, the events of 19 January 2012 seemed to 
betray a level of choreography in the actions of supposedly independent bodies.  In the first place 
the Secretaries of State for Health tasked the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority to seek 
public views on these techniques.67  On the very same day, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
announced that it would conduct its own ethical review of the techniques.68  Finally, also on the 
same day, the Wellcome Trust announced its decision to grant £4.4 million in funding to a centre to 
carry out research in this area.69   
This apparent co-ordination was particularly troubling given that the Wellcome Trust is one of the 
three major funders of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics.70  The coincidence of these announcements 
creates the impression of the Wellcome Trust was not only laying down the agenda for the Council 
but presenting the Council with a fait accompli, an ethical review after the fact of research that the 
Trust had already, very publicly, agreed to fund.   
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics duly produced a report that was supportive of MST and PNT.  This 
report was used to frame the HFEA consultation and together these helped smooth the way for the 
passing of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015.71  As 
in previous cases, the Regulations were passed by a large majority.72  However, by endorsing the 
research funded by its own funder, without declaring an interest, the Nuffield Council “undermine[d] 
the credibility of its conclusion and threaten[ed] the reputation of the Nuffield Council for 
independence.”73  In effect, the national bioethics committee appeared to be used by a funding body 
as an instrument of public policy.74 
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Given the extent of Wellcome Trust involvement in shaping embryo policy in the UK in the last 
decade, it is not surprising that, on the question of human genome editing, the Trust has already 
undertaken proactive steps to fund “a number of initiatives in this space and [is] actively 
participating in discussions in the UK, Europe and globally”.75  These initiatives include funding for 
the Washington summit and working group set up by the US National Academies, as well as for the 
Progress Educational Trust76 and ongoing funding for the Nuffield Council on Bioethics.   
While the Welcome Trust states that it “strongly supports open and inclusive discussions”, it already 
expresses support for “gene editing in a research context” where this is legal and is “ethically and 
scientifically justified”.77  Since 2008 the law in the UK has permitted the genetic modification of 
human embryos for research, subject to a licence, so such research would now be “legal” in the UK.  
The standard for what is deemed “ethically and scientifically justified” may be gauged by the strong 
public support that the Wellcome Trust provided to the proposal to use hybrid embryos in research, 
even though this proposal raises serious ethical questions78 and was eventually abandoned because 
it did not pass the test for funding by anonymous scientific peer review.79   
It certainly seems from these statements that the Wellcome Trust is signalling its opposition to the 
call for a moratorium on gene editing of human embryos in a research context.  This would hardly be 
surprising as this stance would cohere with the dominant policy approach pursued in the UK since 
1990.  In the words of Sarah Norcross, director of the Progress Educational Trust, “banning is not the 
answer”,80 a conclusion about “the answer” that is asserted with confidence even before the 
adequate articulation of the question.  There are prohibitions on certain forms of embryo 
experimentation in UK law but, it has been argued here, these are cosmetic, intended not to restrict 
research activity but to give a reassuring impression to the public.  If the Wellcome Trust is perceived 
to be taking a position against a moratorium, it will be interesting to see whether the working group 
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of the Nuffield Council, an organisation that is part-funded by the Wellcome Trust, chooses to follow 
that lead.81 
A study in contrasts 
The different content and approach of the conferences on gene editing in Washington and London 
reveals features about the bioethics landscape in the two countries.  One difference that is 
immediately apparent is that the summit in Washington was international, and indeed was 
advertised as such.  It drew on knowledge and experience not only from the USA, the UK, and China 
(the sponsoring academies), but also Canada, Egypt, Israel, Korea, Nigeria and a number of countries 
in Europe.82  In contrast, the conference in London included not one speaker based outside the UK.83  
This reflects a common pattern:  the Progress Educational Trust annual conference for 2016 also 
includes no speakers from outside the UK.84  Given this insularity, it is remarkable that a number of 
speakers at the London conference extolled the virtues of the system of regulation in the UK as a 
model for other countries.   
Related to this difference in perspective is a difference in tone.  The tone of the Washington summit 
is perhaps best exemplified by the contribution of Eric Lander: 
Bottom line: My prescription is humility.  It is always good to remind ourselves, especially 
when we have in our hand an amazingly powerful tool like CRISPR gene editing, that we exist 
in a state of very limited knowledge, and human genetic disease is complex.  We still have a 
lot to learn, and it might, might, might be a good idea that—before we make permanent 
changes to the human gene pool—we should exercise considerable caution.85 
In contrast the tone of the London conference was often self-congratulatory, for example in arguing 
that the UK was “the best place” for “mitochondrial donation”86 and that the UK should “lead the 
way in the debate about genome editing of human embryos”.87  Furthermore, any note of caution 
was immediately qualified, “There is a need for caution, but…”88  In the same vein, limited 
knowledge was used as an argument not to slow down but to accelerate research, and hence as a 
reason to resist any moratorium on research “which is in any case unlikely to be effective”.89   
The questioning of the effectiveness of international moratoria betrays the parochial frame of the 
discussion.  The limited effectiveness of moratoria is contrasted with the benefits of “appropriate 
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and proportionate regulations to govern the use of these powerful and important techniques”.90  
However, if it is difficult to secure an effective international moratorium on some technique (or its 
application) securing one is at least imaginable.  There are some moratoria, self-imposed by 
scientific bodies, which have been in place for many years.  In contrast, there is not the slightest 
chance of an international consensus on bureaucratic structures of regulation.  There is no 
international super-regulator for licensing research and national approaches are not harmonious 
even across Europe.   
Without any agreement on what, when, how or who to enforce “proportionate regulations”, the 
impact of the UK decision to approve a particular technique, subject to licence, is simply to 
undermine the prohibition of that technique in other countries.  The UK influence is thus corrupting 
even on its own terms, for it undermines the prohibition in other jurisdictions without any way to 
mitigate this by regulation.  That this adverse influence is not perceived to be a problem attests to 
the narrowly national focus of bioethical discussion in the UK.  Some speakers at the London 
conference acknowledged that “different European countries have fundamentally different views 
about technology”.91  However, the conference structure showed no awareness that a UK audience 
might benefit from hearing these “different views” expounded by people from these different 
countries.   Institutions in the UK typically show interest in the effects that their policies have on 
other countries only insofar as these affect the UK through international agreements or court cases, 
or through health tourism. 
The precedent of ‘three-parent IVF’  
Another difference between the two conferences is evident from the titles.  The London conference 
used the debate surrounding “three-person IVF” (that is, “mitochondrial donation” by MST or PNT) 
as a model for considering gene editing techniques.  In contrast, whereas the US National Academies 
commissioned a separate piece of work on these mitochondrial techniques, it did not consider these 
techniques at the Washington summit.  Furthermore, the US National Academies report, entitled 
Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques (MRT), when it appeared on 17 March 2016, was at pains to 
distinguish these techniques from gene editing.    
The significant and important distinctions between modification of mtDNA to prevent 
transmission of mtDNA disease through MRT and modification of nDNA (1) have implications 
for the ethical, social, and policy issues associated with MRT, and (2) could allow justification 
of MRT independent of decisions about heritable genetic modification of nDNA.92 
The report thus resists the claim that acceptance of MRT sets a precedent for the acceptance of 
gene editing.  This allows the authors of the report to set to one side discussion of the ethics of gene 
editing. 
In contrast the London conference was framed deliberately to bring out similarities between 
“mitochondrial donation” techniques and gene editing.  The reason “why [the Progress Educational 
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Trust] decided to produce this conference”93 is succinctly expressed by Sarah Norcross, director of 
Progress.  Rather than a “temporary ban” on the gene editing of human embryos, Norcross urges 
that “a better model to follow is the parallel scientific, ethical and public consideration of 
mitochondrial donation.”94  
Note here that the regulation of “mitochondrial donation” is offered as a model not only or even 
primarily for the substantive ethical issue of germline modification.  It is a model first for the 
consideration of these techniques by scientists and the public.  Scientists in the UK have yet to 
attempt MST or PNT in a clinical setting.  Nevertheless, the “public consideration” was deemed 
successful in that it facilitated the passing of the desired Regulations.  The clear implication of this 
“better model” is that the public should first be persuaded of “the need for research”95 for human 
genome editing and that such techniques should then be brought within the scope of the UK’s 
permissive bureaucracy.  
When scientists were lobbying for a change in the law to allow MST and PNT, they suggested that 
these techniques did not constitute germline gene therapy.   
Germline gene therapy is a term used for modifying genes in the nuclear genome at the 
beginning of development with the intention of changing the organism in a specific way and 
for potentially transmitting this change to subsequent progeny.  Due to the complexity of 
the nuclear genome, there are risks associated with modifying it, thus only gene therapy 
that avoids the germline is currently permitted.  Replacing diseased mitochondria with 
healthy ones is an inherently less complicated procedure.96  
However, the report from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics admitted that PNT and MST were forms 
of germline gene therapy.  This admission placed the British government in a difficult position 
because it wished to pass the Regulations but also to uphold an EU-wide prohibition on human 
germline modification.  The government resolved this problem, to its own satisfaction, by adopting a 
“working definition” according to which “genetic modification involves the germ-line modification of 
nuclear DNA (in the chromosomes) that can be passed on to future generations”.97  
While the government thus argued that “the proposed mitochondrial donation techniques do not 
constitute genetic modification”,98 some scientists expressed doubts about the significance of this 
distinction.  “The decision to allow three-parent babies is right.  But the fact is, opponents were also 
right to describe this as a step towards tinkering with the rest of our genome… I suspect many 
biologists harbour similar views, but not many say so openly.  Instead, they back three-parent babies 
but say it isn’t really genetic engineering.”99  Indeed, even before the regulations were passed, the 
Progress Educational Trust were arguing that these techniques “can be characterised accurately as a 
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form of human germline genetic modification”, while maintaining that this “does not make [them] 
ethically problematic.”100   
There are important practical differences between the use of gene editing techniques on nuclear 
DNA and “mitochondrial donation”.  MST and PNT, the techniques of “mitochondrial donation”, 
produce a new combination of nuclear DNA from one woman and mitochondrial DNA from another 
woman, but neither the nuclear DNA nor the mitochondrial DNA is modified.  The novel features of 
gene editing technology may well affect how the risk of using it is as weighed in the context of 
human reproduction.  However, if both “mitochondrial donation” and gene editing are forms of 
germline genetic modification, then the techniques are analogous at least in principle.  If the former 
is now permitted, subject to licence, then this provides clear precedent for the other also to be 
permitted. 
Conclusion 
The Washington summit ended with a series of four recommendations:  
1. Basic and preclinical research (including research using human embryos) should proceed, 
“subject to appropriate legal and ethical rules and oversight”; 
2. Clinical use as somatic therapy should be “appropriately and rigorously evaluated within 
existing and evolving regulatory frameworks for gene therapy”; 
3. Clinical use for germline gene therapy “would be irresponsible… unless and until (i) the 
relevant safety and efficacy issues have been resolved… and (ii) there is broad societal 
consensus”; and 
4. There is a need for an ongoing international forum to debate this issue “to establish norms 
concerning acceptable uses of human germline editing and to harmonize regulations”.101 
Neither the London conference nor the preliminary Nuffield Council report included 
recommendations.  It is clear, nevertheless, that recommendation 1 would find strong support 
within the UK.  It is highly regrettable that the Washington summit was not stronger in resisting 
genetic modification of human embryos for “basic” research.  What is “appropriate” and “ethical” in 
this area is the legal prohibition of such research.   
Recommendation 2 is not ethically controversial.   
It is with recommendation 3 that there emerges a distinction between the Washington summit and 
the attitude shown in the London conference, and in UK policy more generally.  Based on the 
analysis of this paper, it seems likely that recommendation 3 would only gain support in the UK if it 
were adopted precisely as a means to help build a “societal consensus” in favour of the in-principle 
acceptability of germline gene therapy.    
Similarly, recommendation 4 would be likely to find support only if it were interpreted to mean, 
“harmonize regulations” to the norms and practices acceptable to the research establishment within 
the United Kingdom.  In general, the impetus to international engagement by the UK stems not from 
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a desire to learn from others102 but from the same strategic approach that informs public 
engagement at a national level.  As with national engagement, it appears in the guise of openness 
and consultation but is directed towards a goal that has already been decided.  The UK model for 
novel biomedical technologies is to default to permissibility, subject to licence.  This is therefore the 
default UK model for germline genetic modification.   
At first sight it would seem that the National Academies of Sciences report Human Genome Editing 
takes a step further than the Washington conference and supports a view closer to that of the UK.  
In relation to germline (heritable) genome editing the report recommends that clinical research trials 
could be permitted in future, though “only for compelling purposes of treating or preventing serious 
disease or disabilities, and only if there is a stringent oversight system able to limit uses to specified 
criteria”.103  
This may seem like an endorsement of germline gene therapy, but the authors of the report admit 
that there are those who doubt their criteria could ever be met.  In particular, “once germline 
modification had begun, the regulatory mechanisms instituted could not limit the technology to the 
uses identified in the recommendation.”104  The authors’ response is that “if it is indeed not possible 
to satisfy the criteria in the recommendation, the committee’s view is that germline genome editing 
would not be permissible”.105 
If germline genome editing were to go ahead, it is naïve to believe that its use could be restricted to 
only a few serious conditions.  Experience shows that once a bright line has been crossed then 
technology extends to more and more uses further and further from the original proposal.  In the 
area of germline modification of human beings the precautionary principle remains the safest ethical 
guide.  Thus while the report of the National Academies of Sciences goes somewhat further that the 
Washington conference, it is far from the enthusiastic promotion of germline interventions that is 
prevalent in the United Kingdom.  
In relation both to the pernicious path of eugenics and to the protection of embryonic human 
beings, the approach of the UK is deeply problematic.  Those who bear witness to these issues within 
the United Kingdom are voices crying in the wilderness.  They are included in consultation exercises 
to help provide the impression of balance but they have little if any effect on the outcome.  In most 
cases, the outcome is substantially determined in advance of consultation. 
The rhetoric of moderation and responsible regulation which characterises embryo policy in the UK 
should not be allowed to obscure the radical instrumentalisation of the human embryo in UK 
practice.  Long before considering the topic of gene editing, the UK has effectively “edited out” the 
human embryo as an object of ethical concern.  In the UK, law and policy in this area is set by a 
powerful alliance of forces in favour of embryo experimentation.  These have had the support of 
successive governments and have had no effective internal opposition. 
In relation to ongoing international discussion on these issues, it is important for those outside the 
United Kingdom to be aware of the way that language is used and policy is pursued within the UK.  
The language of respect for the “special status” of the embryo is used to achieve the opposite, that 
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is, to promote destructive experimentation on human embryos, and the discourse presupposes the 
context of a highly-regulated nation.  Internationally it has the potential to cause even greater harm, 
undermining prohibitions that protect the embryo without even the inhibition of regulation.106  The 
same desire to overcome principled ethical opposition is evident in the prevalent UK attitude to 
eugenics and germline gene therapy.  The only ethical considerations are safety (of adults or of 
children who have been born) and public confidence.  It is to be hoped, therefore, that people of 
good will from different nations will engage vigorously on the issue of genome editing so that it is 
not left to the advocates of embryo experimentation in the United Kingdom to “lead the way in the 
debate about genome editing of human embryos.”107   
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